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International organizations (IOs) are perceived as increasingly important, yet also severely challenged actors in world politics.
How authoritative are IOs, how do they exercise authority, and how has their authority evolved over time? The International
Authority Database (IAD) offers a novel measure of IO authority built from several aspects of an IO’s institutional design. We
provide systematic data on how IOs exercise authority across seven policy functions, using a representative sample of 34 IOs,
based on coding over 200 IO bodies, and covering the period 1920–2013. Empirical applications illustrate how the IAD
advances our understanding of IOs in novel and important ways.
Policy Implications
• Whereas international organizations (IOs) are frequently criticized for not having enough bite, our data reveals that their
authority has grown over time. This development might spark strong resistance against global governance, unless IO
authority is sufficiently legitimated. Policy makers should therefore work towards increasing their legitimacy by establish-
ing sufficiently robust mechanisms of accountability and transparency. Moreover, our data point policy makers to identify
institutional features of IOs that are in particular need of legitimation.
• Our data further reveals that authority is unevenly distributed across IOs. Some organizations, such as the European Union,
wield substantial influence over states; whereas others, such as the Bank for International Settlements, barely constrain
state sovereignty. Policy makers should consider such varying levels of authority when determining which IO can effec-
tively solve problems and which cannot. Policy makers should equally pay attention to the distribution of IO authority
within a given issue area. If the IOs tasked to tackle an important issue such as climate change lack significant authority,
the policy maker should work towards strengthening their institutional framework and policy mandate.
• We also find that IOs are less authoritative than their critics often suggest. The average IO exercises substantial authority
only across a limited number of policy functions. IOs have the highest authority when they set policy agendas and settle
disputes between states but, in most IOs, states remain largely in control over the organization and policy making. Policy
makers that defend IOs should use this insight when confronted with exaggerated claims about the loss of popular sover-
eignty.
• To strengthen the implementation capacity of IOs, policy makers should strengthen the monitoring and enforcement
authority of IOs. Among the functions we consider in our data, the monitoring and enforcement authority of IOs are rela-
tively weakly institutionalized. However, both functions are important to ensure that adopted decisions are implemented
by member states. Our data allow policy makers to identify IOs in which monitoring and enforcement provisions are
weak.
1. Introducing a new dataset on international
organization authority
A key demand in the debate surrounding the 2016 Brexit
referendum was for the United Kingdom (UK) to ‘take back
control’ from European Union (EU) institutions.1 In 2018, Uni-
ted States (US) National Security Advisor, John Bolton,
warned the International Criminal Court (ICC) against com-
ing ‘after us, Israel, or other US allies’ in the Court’s investi-
gation of war crimes in Afghanistan (Bowcott et al., 2018).
At the 2020 G20 summit, leaders pledged to strengthen the
World Health Organization’s (WHO) mandate in coordinating
the international response to COVID-19 and asked the Inter-
national Labour Organization (ILO) and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to monitor
the pandemic’s impact on employment (Wagner, 2020).
These episodes suggest that international organizations (IOs)
are considered as influential actors in international politics
constraining state sovereignty in various important ways.
They also suggest that some IOs are contested (not least for
they are considered too authoritative).
Both observations are supported by extant research on
IOs. Scholars have argued that IOs not only help states real-
ize mutually beneficial cooperation (Keohane, 1984) and
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overcome violent conflict (Oneal and Russett, 2001), but that
they have become increasingly ‘powerful’, ‘independent’,
and ‘authoritative’ actors in their own right. IOs regulate an
increasingly wide range of issues, intervene more deeply in
the domestic affairs of their member states, and develop
and diffuse international norms and rules (Barnett and Fin-
nemore, 2004; Bradley and Kelley, 2008; Haftel and Thomp-
son, 2006; Hawkins et al., 2006; Hooghe et al., 2017; Lake,
2007; Z€urn et al., 2012). At the same time, recent research
suggests that IOs have become contested (Bearce and Scott,
2019; Z€urn, 2018), they experience popular backlash (Walter,
2019), and that states withdraw from them (von Borzys-
kowski and Vabulas, 2019). Both strands of research – those
who argue that IOs have become more authoritative actors,
and those who claim that IOs see their authority questioned
– would benefit from a more complete understanding of
how authoritative IOs are, how they exercise authority, and
how their authority has evolved over time.
The aim of the dataset we present in this article – the
International Authority Database (IAD) – is to contribute to
such an understanding by offering novel data on IO author-
ity.2 We build on quantitative IO scholarship that has begun
to systematically collect data, hence to shed light on various
aspects relevant to the authority of IOs, including their orga-
nizational autonomy and independence (Haftel, 2013; Haftel
and Hofmann, 2017; Haftel and Thompson, 2006), their
capability and mandates (Boehmer et al., 2004; Haftel, 2007;
Lundgren, 2016), the extent of delegation (Brown, 2010),
their voting rules (Blake and Payton, 2015), their openness
to civil society actors (Tallberg et al., 2013), or the extent of
pooling and delegation in IOs’ constitutional and administra-
tive proceedings (Hooghe and Marks, 2015; Hooghe et al.,
2017). These contributions have greatly improved our under-
standing of IOs. However, these studies either focus on
specific subsets of IOs, such as regional and economic orga-
nizations, cover only particular aspects of IO authority (such
as autonomy or independence of decision-making), or com-
pare IOs at just one point in time.
The IAD advances the quantitative study of IOs by making
two distinct contributions to the field. First, our data capture
IO authority by focusing on how IOs exercise authority over
states when designing and implementing substantive poli-
cies. Authority, in our view, denotes the recognized right to
issue binding decisions and make competent judgments.
We argue that this concept contains two dimensions –
autonomy and bindingness (see also Abbott et al., 2000).
For an IO to exercise authority it must act with a degree of
autonomy (Abbott and Snidal, 1998; Haftel and Thompson,
2006). However, autonomy in itself does not constitute
authority unless the decisions have effects on addressees,
which we capture through the varying bindingness of IO
rules and decisions (see also Bradley and Kelley, 2008).
Using the product of autonomy and bindingness, we offer a
novel and more complete single measure of authority.
Second, our data is the first to provide systematic com-
parative information about the exercise of IO authority
across the full policy cycle, including agenda setting, rule
making, monitoring, norm interpretation, enforcement,
knowledge generation, and evaluation. The IAD contains
data on how 34 IOs exercise authority across these seven
policy functions, covering the period from 1919 until 2013.
It could be of interest to both qualitative and quantitative
IO scholars that may use our data to inform case selection
or to examine why certain functions grow in authority over
time across all IOs, while others do not. Moreover, because
we have constructed our data in a modular way, it is possi-
ble to combine subsets of our data (e.g. monitoring and
enforcement) and tailor them to individual research ques-
tions, thus generating different or more specific measures of
IO authority.
Taken together, the IAD offers new data on the exercise
of IO authority across organizations and over time. It will
allow scholars to examine IO authority as an independent
variable, explaining IO legitimacy, performance, contestation,
or the withdrawal from IOs, for instance. Alternatively, our
measure can be used to systematically examine whether
and how IO features such as membership, preference distri-
butions, or other independent variables (e.g. power differen-
tials between states) affect the exercise of IO authority.
In the remainder of this article, we first present our con-
cept of authority, unpacking it into its constitutive dimen-
sions of autonomy and bindingness. We then explain our
measurement approach and discuss sampling before we
present some applications of the IAD, showing how our data
can be used to examine important aspects of IO authority.
We also compare our data with the Measuring International
Authority (MIA) dataset (Hooghe et al., 2017) to both high-
light how our data differs from MIA and identify comple-
mentarities that scholars can leverage in future research.
2. The exercise of IO authority
Our database centers on the concept of authority. There are
many definitions of authority in both political philosophy
and empirical social science, but all classical concepts (Blau,
1963; Friedman, 1990; Weber, 1968) have one thing in com-
mon: those who recognize authority defer their own judg-
ment or choice without being necessarily forced or
persuaded to do so (Arendt, 1970). An authority is recog-
nized because it is considered as trustworthy to make the
right decisions or interpretations. Authority is an important
source of power and it can mean both having permission to
do something and having the right to grant such permission
(Raz, 1990).
Authority is usually associated with domestic institutions,
such as governments, the police, or the courts. Yet, the con-
cept of authority is applicable to political actors and institu-
tions beyond the state, including IOs. IOs operate in a
context in which sovereign states remain (the) dominant
actors, commanding material resources exceeding those of
IOs by far. Typically, states are not forced or coerced to join
and obey IOs. Rather, IOs acquire authority through states’
voluntary deference in line with Weber’s (1968) sociological
concept of authority. In our approach, authority can be
observed when states recognize that an organization can
make binding decisions and competent judgments to
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further a common good. We thus operationalize the socio-
logical concept of authority by looking at institutional fea-
tures of IOs. States’ principled recognition of IO authority
expresses itself in two ways: in the creation of, accession to,
and continued operation of IOs; and, in that states endow
them with specific competences to perform a set of policy
functions in their stead.
While we do not deny that informal rules and practices
matter, our focus on institutional design and thus formal
rules have at least two advantages (see Hooghe et al., 2017;
Tallberg et al., 2013). First, unlike informal authority, formal
authority is empirically observable through publicly available
legal documents across a large set of IOs and can, as a
result, be replicated. Second, informal rules and practices
tend to bind states less than formal rules and practices do,
especially in cases of conflicts of interest. Formal attributes
constitute a baseline of international authority for states
themselves and delimit their explicit recognition of IO
authority.
2.1. Measuring IO authority
We understand IO authority as the grant of the right to
make binding decisions and/or competent judgments that is
expressed through the formal properties and attributes of
an organization. In line with legalization theory (Abbott
et al., 2000; Bradley and Kelley, 2008), we argue that IO
authority is jointly constituted by two dimensions: by its
autonomy and by the bindingness of its rules and decisions.
Whereas we conceptualize and measure autonomy and
bindingness as two distinct institutional dimensions, they
both interact to determine an IO’s authority. Prior research
has prominently theorized this relationship. In a seminal
contribution, Abbott et al. (2000) suggest that the legaliza-
tion of international institutions depends on their delegation
– states’ transfer of competences to independent bodies –
and their obligation – how much they legally commit states
to international rules.3 Similarly, Bradley and Kelley (2008)
and Haftel and Thompson (2006) suggest that an interna-
tional actors’ autonomy or independence is insufficient to
capture how much this actor can influence state behavior
(through the legal effects of its rules). To be authoritative,
therefore, an IO must both enjoy some degree of autono-
mous decision-making over states and must have the capac-
ity to commit or bind the addressees of its rules and
decisions to the agreed course of action (Z€urn et al., 2012).
Scholars agree that IOs can only be authoritative if they
enjoy some level of autonomy – understood as not being
under the control of each of its member states (see e.g.
Abbott and Snidal, 1998; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Haf-
tel and Thompson, 2006; Hooghe et al., 2017). Secretariats,
such as the European Commission, are examples of such IO
bodies that are largely insulated from individual member
states’ preferences and influence and are therefore highly
autonomous. But autonomy is not confined to secretariats
and other independent bodies; it can extend to policy-mak-
ing organs within the organization that are composed of a
(s)elect subset of member states. Acting in the name of the
institution, these bodies – typically an IO’s governing body –
may adopt decisions for some or all members of the organi-
zation. The United Nations (UN) Security Council is an exam-
ple of such an IO body. Its 15 members adopted Resolution
1540 with majority vote, obliging all 193 UN member states
to implement domestic legislation against the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction without requiring the con-
sent of the entire UN membership. We determine the auton-
omy of the Security Council by taking into account that it is
a governing body acting on behalf of all UN member states
and the decision-making rules within that body. We explain
our coding of autonomy in more detail below.
However, IO autonomy is not sufficient for IO authority as
independent bodies without bite might barely influence the
behavior of their rule addressees. To fully capture IO author-
ity, we therefore require an additional dimension: binding-
ness. Bindingness denotes the degree to which IO rules and
decisions reduce the policy discretion of member states
(Abbott et al., 2000; Bradley and Kelley, 2008; Cooper et al.,
2008). An IO has different instruments at its disposal that
are meant to commit member states to an agreed course of
action. These instruments indicate acceptance of the right
to impose costs on member states. For example, if policy
decisions are only conditionally binding, the IO has less lee-
way to constrain state behavior compared to policy deci-
sions that are directly binding. Relatedly, IOs that have the
right to monitor state compliance with on-site inspections
(e.g. IMF) limit state discretion more than IOs that are only
entitled to collect and distribute states’ compliance self-re-
ports. When an IO possesses the recognized right to apply
military sanctions (e.g. African Union), it can restrain mem-
ber states’ behavior more than when it is only allowed to
redress noncompliance through calls for corrective action.
Accordingly, to the extent that such instruments constrain
state behavior, they determine the IO’s (formal) capacity to
bind its member states. An IO’s bindingness can vary along
a continuum, depending on the available instruments and
the extent to which these limit state discretion. To measure
bindingness, we code the relevant formal rules and instru-
ments in treaties and related legal documents.
Because autonomy and bindingness in our concept jointly
constitute authority, an IO has authority only if it enjoys a
minimum level of organizational autonomy and if its rules
and decisions can bind its member states (at least to some
extent). For example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC) has significant autonomy in developing
recommendations for tackling climate change. Yet, these do
not formally bind states. By contrast, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) decisions are highly binding on
member states, but it needs the consensus of all states in
order to reach a decision – it has very little autonomy. This
suggests that autonomous IOs that cannot constrain their
member states, or IOs that can adopt binding rules and pol-
icy output but have no autonomy, do not exercise authority
over states. As a result, neither of the two dimensions is
substitutable; both are necessary and jointly sufficient for IO
authority (Goertz, 2006).4 While being more conservative,
our concept allows us to empirically distinguish IO authority
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from other important design features, such as independence
or autonomy.
2.2. The exercise of IO authority across policy functions
How do IOs exercise authority across important policy func-
tions that they are tasked to perform? Because we are inter-
ested in how IOs exercise authority over their member
states rather than in aspects of policy making within IOs, we
concentrate on institutional processes by which IOs initiate,
debate, adopt, implement, adjudicate, and evaluate substan-
tive policies. For each policy function, we briefly discuss
their autonomy and bindingness, which we analyze based
on institutional rules.
Agenda setting denotes the stage where policies are
included or excluded for subsequent decision-making.
Autonomy is high when the proposal and negotiation of
agenda items involve not only states, but also the IO secre-
tariat and non-state third parties (e.g. other IOs). Binding-
ness, in turn, depends on how easily – in terms of decision-
making rules – the agenda can be modified by each individ-
ual state (Tsebelis, 2002). Should it be more demanding to
change agenda items than to propose them, the costs of
changing them – and hence political bindingness – increase
for each individual state.
Rule making comprises the procedures to set substantive
rules and policies. An IO’s rule-making autonomy is high if
each individual state’s control over decisions or interpreta-
tions is weak (Blake and Payton, 2015). The legal binding-
ness of the adopted policy instruments – ranging from mere
advice to unconditionally legally binding decisions – deter-
mines the bindingness of rule making.
Monitoring is the collection of information on member
state compliance and performance. Monitoring autonomy is
highest when dedicated international bodies (e.g. secretari-
ats) exclusively monitor compliance and performance. The
bindingness of monitoring depends on the intrusiveness of
an IO’s right to access, collect, process, and evaluate compli-
ance-relevant information, such as through on-site inspec-
tions (Brown, 2010; Dai, 2002). Such monitoring instruments
limit state discretion to varying degrees by curtailing their
options to selectively decide on the provision of compli-
ance-relevant information.
Norm interpretation is the act of passing judgments in
order to solve conflicts of interest and disagreements on
facts and the meaning of norms. The less the initiation and
decision process is confined to member states – such as
when international courts adjudicate norm conflicts – the
higher the IOs’ norm interpretation autonomy (Alter, 2014).
The bindingness of norm interpretation depends on the
extent to which judgments and interpretations are binding
and on the ease of appeal against them.
Enforcement refers to the imposition of costs on non-com-
pliant state parties (Downs et al., 1996; Fearon, 1998).
Enforcement autonomy is high when international bodies
impose sanctions and when the decision on sanctions is
removed from member state control. The types of sanctions
available to IOs determine the bindingness of enforcement.
IOs generate knowledge when they collect, categorize,
and process information on substantive problems they are
meant to govern. The less IOs rely on input by states and
the more they can independently develop knowledge gen-
erating practices (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004), the more
their autonomy grows. The output of this function binds
states more when the results of knowledge generation enter
policy agendas as standing items and when they are widely
disseminated, thereby affecting public debates.
Finally, evaluation denotes the review of internal opera-
tions and procedures with regard to their suitability for
achieving the policy aims of IOs. Autonomy is high, when
evaluators are appointed by the IO rather than by states as
this enhances their standing as neutral and trustworthy
sources of expertise. The findings of evaluation processes
bind states to the extent that they produce recommenda-
tions for intra-institutional change that enter the policy
agendas of IOs.
3. Coding and aggregation
In this section, we discuss the coding of the autonomy and
bindingness dimensions of authority, illustrate our coding
for one policy function – rule making – in more detail,
briefly explain how we aggregate authority at the policy
function and IO level, and present our sample selection. A
more technical exposition is given in Supplementary Mate-
rial Appendix S1.
3.1. Coding
To determine autonomy and bindingness per policy func-
tion, IO, and year, we developed a comprehensive and
detailed coding instrument that features more than 100
items and that is required to capture the exercise of IO
authority in adequate detail and validity. We apply this
instrument to several hundred IO bodies of the 34 IOs, cod-
ing more than 1,000 individual legal documents. As these
legal documents assign policy functions to IO bodies and
specify each body’s mandate and competences, they allow
us to identify, for example, which specific body is tasked to
monitor compliance or adjudicate disputes between states.
To code an IO’s autonomy, we focus on the adoption pro-
cess of decisions, actions, and policies to ask who makes
the decision (type of IO body) and how they are made (vot-
ing rule). We distinguish three types of IO bodies: (1) Assem-
blies that comprise the entire membership; (2) governing
bodies that represent a subset of members; and (3) inde-
pendent organs, such as IO secretariats, standing courts, or
parliaments. To capture how decisions are made within
these bodies, we code three types of voting rules: (1) una-
nimity; (2) qualified majority; and (3) simple majority voting.
To arrive at a single autonomy score, we cross-tabulate the
categories of IO body type and voting rule and obtain nine
potential combinations. We rank each of these combinations
as indicated in Table 1. The ranking is based on the follow-
ing rule: the less each member state is able to fully control
IO decisions and interpretations, the higher IO autonomy is,
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and vice versa. For example, the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit – the IO’s assembly – adopts
decisions by unanimity (voting rule), giving each ASEAN
member full control (and a de facto veto right) over deci-
sions. IO autonomy is therefore extremely low.5 By contrast,
the IMF’s Executive Board – the IO’s governing body –
adopts most policies per qualified majority. The IMF’s auton-
omy is higher than ASEAN’s, as a subset of states decides
on behalf of all other member states with a decision rule
that does not require each state’s consent.
Turning to bindingness as the second dimension of IO
authority, we determine the extent to which adopted poli-
cies or judgments can limit state discretion. For two of our
seven functions – rule making and norm interpretation – we
identify the extent to which the adopted policies and judg-
ments are binding, differentiating between non-binding,
conditionally binding, and directly binding. For the remain-
ing policy functions – agenda setting, monitoring, knowl-
edge generation, enforcement, and evaluation – we code
the bindingness of the different instruments the IO is enti-
tled to impose upon its member states (e.g. membership
suspension, economic sanctions, unannounced on-site moni-
toring, routine and regular monitoring, and expert knowl-
edge as standing item in policy agendas).
The coding of a specific policy function may further clarify
our approach. To code the rule-making authority of an IO,
we again start with the autonomy dimension of rule mak-
ing.6 We check whether an IO’s foundational legal texts con-
tain any rule-making procedures at all. If it does not, we
assign the code ‘not included in agreement’. Otherwise, we
record all the policy instruments available to an IO. Next, we
identify the IO body type that adopts each policy instru-
ment. For instance, the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) Conference of member states adopts Conventions,
while the FAO’s Executive Committee adopts Supplementary
Agreements. Our codes for IO body type of the FAO thus are
‘assembly’ for Conventions, and ‘governing body’ for Supple-
mentary Agreements. We further assign the code ‘indepen-
dent organ involved’ to non-state bodies, such as
secretariats, if they partake in governing bodies’ adoption of
policy instruments with more than just administrative sup-
port (e.g. policy assessments and own proposals). Having
coded the policy instruments for each IO body, we subse-
quently code voting rules. For instance, the FAO assembly
adopts Conventions with ‘qualified majority’. The Executive
Committee passes Supplementary Agreements with ‘qualified
majority’. In the final step of our coding of autonomy, we
combine the scores on IO body type and voting rule accord-
ing to the scheme in Table 1.
We then code the bindingness dimension of rule making.
To measure the bindingness of rule making, we assess the
extent of bindingness of each policy instrument. If the foun-
dational legal texts do not stipulate any binding instrument,
we assign the code ‘no binding instrument’ (value 0). Other-
wise, we check whether the policy instrument is condition-
ally binding (value 1) or directly binding (value 2). For
instance, FAO Conventions and Supplementary Agreements
are conditionally binding because state ratification is
required. Policy instruments put the highest legal constraints
on states if they are directly binding (e.g. UN Security Coun-
cil Chapter VII resolutions).
3.2. Aggregation
Once we have coded and scored the autonomy and bind-
ingness dimensions for each of the seven policy functions,
we compute authority scores at the policy function level
and sum up the values for the overall authority of an IO. At
the policy function level, we rescale the scores of autonomy
and bindingness to range between 0 and 1, respectively.
Because autonomy and bindingness jointly constitute
authority, the aggregation rule should translate this relation-
ship into a single score. Formally, authority is the product of
autonomy and bindingness. We therefore calculate function-
level authority scores with the geometric mean as it is well
suited to aggregate autonomy and bindingness according
to our concept.7 We obtain an overall authority score per
function by picking the IO body with the highest authority
score. We choose to use the highest score because we are
interested in the maximum degree of competences and
rights that states are willing to grant to the IO.8 Finally, we
take the sum of all seven function-level scores per IO to
arrive at the overall authority per IO and year. We rescale
that value to range between 0 and 1.9
3.3. Sample selection
Collecting detailed, comprehensive data on the exercise of
authority across IOs, across policy functions, and over time
requires an in-depth coding of a large number of legal doc-
uments. We therefore used stratified random sampling to
draw a geographically and thematically representative sam-
ple of IOs, resulting in 34 IOs that we coded annually from
the year in which it was created until the year 2013. Overall,
we coded several hundred IO bodies and more than 1,000
legal documents. A brief description of our sample selection
is in order.10
We follow the approach of the ‘Transnational Access to
IOs’ project (Sommerer and Tallberg, 2017; Tallberg et al.,
2013) and use their population list of IOs as the population
from which we sample. We use the selection rules by Som-
merer and Tallberg (2017) because they unambiguously
identify the criteria organizations require to exercise
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authority in the first place. Accordingly, IOs: (1) must be
intergovernmental and independent; (2) must have at least
three member states; and (3) must be active as of 2012. Fur-
thermore: (4) IOs with predecessors count as one organiza-
tion (e.g. European Community and the EU). Criteria 1 and 2
ensure that IOs are formal entities created by states through
a legal act (e.g. treaty) and that states are the main actors
explicitly granting authority to IOs and thereby recognizing
them. Moreover, the independence criterion (1) is particu-
larly relevant to us, because it makes sure that an IO’s pol-
icy-making competences are not determined by other IOs,
which also excludes emanations – IOs created by other IOs
– from our IO population. Criterion 3 confines our popula-
tion to those IOs that are active in that they hold regular
meetings, which is a precondition for exercising authority.
Applying these criteria results in a population of 174 IOs.
Having defined the relevant population of IOs, we catego-
rize each IO into different strata. The purpose of the stratifi-
cation is to obtain a representative sample of IOs,
minimizing potential bias. We stratify on issue area and
region, because prior research has demonstrated their
importance in explaining the creation and design of IOs
(B€orzel, 2016; Hooghe et al., 2016; Keohane and Nye, 1977;
Koremenos et al., 2001; Tallberg et al., 2013). We define four
broad issue areas (economy, human rights and culture, secu-
rity, and multi-issue) and five regions, following the UN’s
classification of world regions (Africa, Americas, Asia, Europe,
World). We assign each of the 174 IOs to one of the result-
ing 20 region–issue combinations and sample 20 per cent
through stratified random sampling. This results in our final
sample of 34 IOs. Our sample is representative both of the
regional and issue area distribution of IOs in our population.
It is also of manageable size to code IO authority in detail.
Table 2 shows the target number of IOs required to
obtain a representative sample (column T) and the number
of actually sampled IOs (column S) for each stratum.11 Some
of our strata deliberately contain better-known IOs, such as
the IMF or ASEAN, as these are particularly relevant for IO
scholarship. To give an example, our sampling target for
European multi-issue IOs is just one IO. Relying solely on
pure chance, this could have resulted in the selection of the
Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). However, to better
capture relevant authority patterns in Europe, we would
have picked the EU instead. This approach may
overrepresent prominent IOs in some strata. However, while
we know that region and issue area affect the distribution
and design of IOs, whether prominent IOs exercise more
authority is an open empirical question. In Appendix S1, we
provide systematic evidence showing that our sample is
unbiased with respect to important predictors of IOs’ institu-
tional design. Specifically, computing sampling weights for
geography, issue area, and IO prominence, we demonstrate
that bias with respect to these predictors is not an issue in
our sample (see Table SI.9 in the Appendix S1). In other
words, our sample is representative of the distribution of
IOs in our population. We list the sampled IOs in Table SI.7.
4. Applications of the IAD
To illustrate how the IAD advances the study of IO authority,
we: (1) highlight how we use our single measure to com-
pare the distribution of authority within and across IOs; (2)
examine the exercise of authority over policy functions and
its temporal dynamics; and (3) contrast our data with a simi-
lar large-N project on IO authority, the MIA project by
Hooghe et al. (2017).
4.1. Authority across IOs
The IAD single authority measure allows us to directly com-
pare and rank the overall authority of IOs.
Figure 1 displays the authority score of 34 IOs in the year
2010. The sample mean of authority (0.27; standard devia-
tion of 0.18) shows that the exercise of authority is mean-
ingful but limited. By including both dimensions –
autonomy and bindingness – authority seems to be more
moderately developed than expected.12 At the same time,
there is considerable variation across IOs with the EU (0.70),
the UN (0.62), the Andean Community (0.55), and the IMF
(0.54) scoring high on authority (however, none of the IOs
in our sample reaches the theoretically possible maximum
value of 1).13 By contrast, some organizations, such as the
Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) or the Commonwealth Secre-
tariat (Commsec), have an authority score of zero, indicating
the lack of either autonomous and/or binding policy making
across all functions.
Still other organizations score low on authority because
they rely on rather consensus-oriented decision rules and
Table 2. Sampling targets
Economy Human rights Security Multi-issue Total
T S T S T S T S T S
Africa 4 4 1 1 0 0 1 1 6 6
Americas 3 3 1 1 0 0 1 1 5 5
Asia 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 4
Europe 2 2 2 2 0 0 1 1 5 5
World 8 8 4 4 1 1 1 1 14 14
Total 19 19 8 8 2 2 5 5 34 34
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only transfer competences to very specific functions. ASEAN
(e.g. modestly authoritative norm interpretation), the Shang-
hai Cooperation Organization (SCO; e.g. modest agenda-set-
ting authority), or the Organization of Islamic Conference
(OIC; e.g. modestly authoritative norm interpretation) rate
low on the aggregate authority score (see also Jetschke and
Katada, 2016). Interestingly, in addition to the EU, two other
regional organizations, the Andean Community and the Afri-
can Union (AU), score relatively high on authority, support-
ing scholarship that highlights the importance of these
organizations for regional governance in the Global South
(Risse, 2016).
The authority of IOs considerably varies across issue areas,
too. The security IOs in our sample (NATO, the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], and SCO) fall
into the lowest quarter of the distribution (25th percentile),
whereas two commodity and/or resource management IOs
(the International Coffee Organization [ICO], and the North-
west Atlantic Fisheries Organization [NAFO]) display author-
ity scores well above the median (0.25). This suggests that
states are more reluctant to delegate authority to alliance or
disarmament organizations than to IOs that regulate com-
modities, reflecting partially the distinction between high
and low politics (Keohane and Nye, 1977).
Not only does IO authority vary across IOs, but it also
does so within them across different policy functions.
Figure 2 compares the distribution of function-level author-
ity scores of four IOs. The upper half of Figure 2 shows two
economic IOs from two different world regions: the Andean
Community (Latin America) and the Central African Eco-
nomic and Monetary Community (CEMAC; Africa). The bot-
tom half of Figure 2 displays two multi-issue IOs from two
different regions: the AU and the UN.
Figure 2 allows us to compare not only the ranking of
functions within IOs (from most authoritative to least), but
also the distribution of individual function-level authority
scores. In both the Andean Community and CEMAC, knowl-
edge generation scores highest in authority. As specialized
IOs, the secretariats and specialized bodies of both organiza-
tions produce relevant information, data, and studies on the
substantive problems they are meant to govern. This knowl-
edge, in turn, informs the setting of policies and rules as
evidenced by similarly high scores of both organizations on
rule making. Likewise, norm interpretation authority is high,
as both organizations have standing courts that settle dis-
putes among member states and interpret rules and proce-
dures with binding force (Helfer et al., 2009). Thus, the
profile of both IOs in terms of the ranking of functions is
similar. When comparing individual function scores, how-
ever, there are notable differences between Andean and
CEMAC in that the latter has no monitoring and enforce-
ment authority, while the Andean Community is equipped
with relatively autonomous and politically binding monitor-
ing and enforcement functions. This variation in function-
level authority of IOs operating in the same issue raises
interesting questions about its possible drivers.
The bottom part of Figure 2 shows that the rank order of
policy functions of the AU and the UN are similar, while the
UN achieves higher function-level scores. Indeed, with the
exception of knowledge generation, all function-level scores
correlate positively. Both IOs score high on agenda-setting
authority, reflecting that their respective secretariats sub-
stantively partake in shaping their policy agendas. The UN
possesses strong rule-making competences through directly
binding Chapter VII resolutions, for example, and the AU
achieves above-average scores on rule making (the rule-
Figure 1. Distribution of authority across IOs (in 2010).
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making mean is 0.32, see Table 3), as its Executive Council
can adopt regulations that are directly binding for AU mem-
ber states.
Because both organizations have an explicit mandate to
maintain international (the UN) or regional (the AU) peace
and security, they also score high on enforcement and norm
interpretation authority (at least one standard deviation
above the mean of enforcement or norm interpretation).
Again, these patterns raise interesting questions as to
whether the convergence in both IOs’ function-level author-
ity is driven by the similarity of their mandates or processes
of diffusion (B€orzel, 2016; Jetschke and Lenz, 2013). The
detailed information we provide on function-level authority,
here within IOs, can help scholars develop explanations and
empirical tests for these patterns. It can also be used to
inform case selection in qualitative studies.
4.2. Authority across policy functions
How do IOs exercise authority, and have there been any sig-
nificant changes over time? To examine these questions, we
report the average authority per policy function across all
IOs and years, and then show how these functions have
evolved over time. Table 3 contains descriptive statistics for
each of the seven policy functions, and Figure 3 plots the
cumulative sum of authority per function over time.
Our data show that there is considerable variation in IO
authority across policy functions as well as over time. The
agenda-setting average across all IOs in our sample scores
highest, suggesting that IOs exercise the highest level of
authority when policies are initiated. Moreover, Figure 3
shows that agenda setting has considerably grown over
Figure 2. Within IO variation in policy function authority.
Table 3. Distribution of authority across IO policy functions
Mean SD Min Max
Agenda setting 0.45 0.40 0.00 1.00
Rule making 0.32 0.30 0.00 0.94
Monitoring 0.14 0.17 0.00 1.00
Norm interpretation 0.37 0.35 0.00 1.00
Enforcement 0.17 0.28 0.00 1.00
Knowledge generation 0.27 0.43 0.00 1.00
Evaluation 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.71
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time, indicating that international bodies, including IO secre-
tariats, have expanded their influence over the structure and
contents of policy agendas in IOs. This is consistent with
research on agenda-setting powers of the EU (Pollack, 1997),
but it also suggests that IO secretariats more generally exer-
cise substantial and growing influence over IOs’ policy agen-
das.
The interpretation of norms – comprising both the settle-
ment of disputes and treaty interpretation – ranks second,
resonating with recent accounts on the increased impor-
tance of international courts (Alter, 2014). International
courts and expert bodies, such as the World Trade Organiza-
tion’s (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body, exemplify the sub-
stantial growth in norm interpretation authority of IOs that
correlates with the growing quality and density of interna-
tional obligations (see Figure 3). Rule making scores rela-
tively high in terms of authority as well. By 2013, the
cumulative rule-making authority of IOs had reached the
third highest value of all functions. This trend seems to be
driven by the expansion of (simple) majority voting within
most IO governing bodies and by more binding policy deci-
sions (Blake and Payton, 2015).
Together, initiating, adopting, and adjudicating policies
and rules are the most authoritative functions IOs perform.
As shown in Figure 3, these three functions have also con-
siderably grown over time when compared to the other
functions.
The authority of IOs to generate knowledge, in turn,
achieves a medium authority score, demonstrating that
states are only partially willing to endow IOs with authorita-
tive epistemic tasks. At the same time, knowledge genera-
tion has risen in authority over time, suggesting a modest
increase in IOs autonomously collecting data on substantive
issues, processing it, and using it to develop policy propos-
als. This pattern speaks to the growing engagement of IOs
in authoritative epistemic practices (Doshi et al., 2019).
By contrast, our data show (perhaps not unexpectedly)
that states are far more reluctant to delegate monitoring
and enforcement authority to IOs that verify compliance
and that have the right to impose costs in cases of rule vio-
lations (Abbott and Snidal, 2000; Downs et al., 1996). Some-
what surprisingly, states seem to be even more reluctant to
delegate monitoring authority than enforcement authority
to the IOs in our sample. The comparatively low means of
both functions also reflect a weak growth pattern of moni-
toring and enforcement authority over time.
Finally, the evaluation function scores lowest in authority,
and its limited growth trajectory in Figure 3 shows that
Figure 3. Cumulative sum of authority per function and over time (1920–2013).
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evaluation provisions have barely been institutionalized in
past decades. Although scholars point out that it is increas-
ingly common for IOs to have internal evaluation mecha-
nisms (Gutner and Thompson, 2010), our data show that
states control these mechanisms and are reluctant to autho-
rize IOs to evaluate themselves.
The policy function averages reported in Table 3, how-
ever, do not reflect the considerable variation in authority
that exists across IOs. As indicated by relatively large stan-
dard deviations, there are some IOs with extremely low
degrees of authority per function, and some that attain the
maximum score. For example, in 2010, the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements had no rule-making authority. By contrast,
in the same year, the North Atlantic Fisheries Organization
(NAFO) scored 1 on knowledge generation.
Overall, the application of our data reveals three main
patterns in the exercise of IO authority. First, on average, IO
authority is significant, but it is more limited than often sug-
gested in the qualitative and quantitative IO scholarship.
Second, there is considerable variation both across and
within IOs. Some organizations exercise very high levels of
authority, and a few have no authority at all. Third, as indi-
cated by the temporal dynamis of IO policy functions, IO
authority has grown over time. Furthermore, we observe
remarkable variation across function-level authority even
within IOs that have similar mandates.
4.3. Contrasting the IAD with MIA
Hooghe et al. (2017) have recently presented an important
dataset on the authority of IOs (MIA). We share MIA’s ambi-
tions and goals in that we code institutional design features
to produce measures of formal IO authority. At the same
time, our approach and data differ from MIA in important
ways.
First, while MIA assesses bindingness in some decision
areas, including policy making and budgetary allocation
(Hooghe et al., 2017), its main goal is to measure the extent
of autonomy, either via pooling or delegation. By contrast,
and due to our concept of authority, we code both auton-
omy and bindingness for each of the seven policy functions
to identify the extent to which IOs escape the control of
each of its member states and limit state discretion over the
(entire) policy cycle. To combine these two dimensions, we
use the geometric mean instead of the arithmetic one. Our
single aggregate score of IO authority is based on the aver-
age of the product (geometric mean) of autonomy and
bindingness, reflecting the mutual non-substitutability of
both dimensions of authority.
Second, the decision areas – MIA’s equivalent to IAD pol-
icy functions – differ across the two projects. The decision
areas in MIA capture important aspects of an IO’s internal
governance, such as budget allocation, treaty revision, mem-
bership rules, or financial compliance, with the exception of
policy making that focuses on the adoption of rules.14 The
IAD’s main focus, by contrast, is on the functions that cap-
ture the external dimension of IO authority because IOs tar-
get and regulate state behavior by designing, setting,
monitoring, enforcing, adjudicating, and reviewing substan-
tive policies.
These differences affect the degree of authority each
dataset assigns to IOs. To illustrate, Table 4 ranks the IOs
that overlap in both datasets for the year 2010 (N = 33)
from high to low authority based on the IAD’s score (first
column). The third column represents the rank of the
respective IO according to MIA’s delegation variable. The last
column shows how each IO ranks according to MIA’s pool-
ing score. As shown in the table, there are notable differ-
ences in IO authority between both datasets that we explain
further below.
The MIA project looks at authority relationships concern-
ing an IO’s internal operation to influence, for instance, the
administrative selection of development projects in the
World Bank.15 Because the World Bank’s internal budget allo-
cation is controlled by member states, its internal autonomy
is relatively low, explaining its mid-rank position on MIA’s
delegation and pooling scores. In contrast, our focus is on
the external authority of the Bank (and the IMF) in terms of
Table 4. Ranking of IOs according to the IAD authority measure
and MIA indicators
Authority IO Delegation Pooling
1 EU 1 21
2 UN 19 7
3 Andean 6 22
4 IMF 12 18
5 WB 13 11
6 AU 11 5
7 FAO 21 4
8 ICC 7 12
9 Caricom 10 15
10 WHO 22 2
11 WTO 4 6
12 ILO 2 9
13 NAFO 25 23
14 CEMAC 3 20
15 PIF 14 17
16 UNESCO 26 1
17 NC 30 30
18 SADC 8 19
19 NATO 28 32
20 CoE 5 8
21 OAS 17 10
22 OECD 27 29
23 OAPEC 20 24
24 OSCE 23 26
25 IWC 31 14
26 BIS 9 3
27 IGAD 32 27
28 ASEAN 16 28
29 SCO 29 25
30 NAFTA 18 31
31 OIC 33 13
32 UMA 24 33
33 Commsec 15 16
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its core policies and their effect on member states. This
leads to different evaluations. Specifically, the IAD takes into
account that the Bank’s – and the IMF’s – loan agreements
are typically negotiated and adopted in governing councils
and come with significant strings attached for borrowing
countries. Moreover, the conditionality criteria as well as the
corresponding compliance monitoring authority constrain
member states in important ways. As a result, two of the
Bretton Woods Institutions rank among the most authorita-
tive IOs in the IAD. The fact that the two projects focus on
different policy functions also explains the differences in the
ranking of the UN and the FAO, for example. According to
the IAD, the UN is the second most authoritative IO,
whereas it ranks 7th (pooling) and 19th (delegation) in MIA.
Again, these differences result from a different perspective
on sanctioning procedures and mandates of IOs. Whereas
MIA codes whether an IO can punish member states in
financial arrears, the IAD identifies the extent to which IOs
have enforcement authority if member states violate sub-
stantive obligations or binding policy decisions. Given that
the UN can impose sanctions (e.g. when members violate
UN Chapter VII resolutions), it ranks high on IAD authority.
The FAO ranks higher in authority in our dataset for yet
another reason. We measure the extent to which IOs are
authorized to generate knowledge, while a similar function
does not exist in the MIA data. The FAO produces expert
knowledge on agriculture and related subjects and incorpo-
rates it into its policies. The FAO further accepts non-state
organizations as members (e.g. the EU) that enjoy agenda
proposal rights driving up the organization’s agenda-setting
authority. As a result, the FAO’s authority scores higher in
the IAD than it does in MIA.
In summary, MIA and the IAD represent two distinct mea-
sures, each focusing on different yet complementary aspects
of IO authority, offering scholars new systematic evidence
on IOs. The choice of the database will mainly depend on
the research question. Moreover, the two databases can be
used in combination. To give just two brief examples,
researchers could combine MIA’s information on financial
decision making with the IAD monitoring function to assess
not only the monitoring competences of IOs but also their
financial independence. Alternatively, they could examine
the influence of IO secretariats by combining IAD informa-
tion on their agenda setting and knowledge generation
authority with MIA data on how the Secretary-General is
selected and removed from office.
5. Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to contribute to the growing
systematic research on IOs by introducing a new dataset on
their authority: the IAD. Building on an understanding that
authority is more than autonomy, but that it also requires
IOs to have some capacity to issue binding decisions and
judgments, we provide a single score of an IO’s overall
authority and how they exercise authority across seven key
policy functions. The cross-section time-series data we offer
can be used by scholars as dependent variables to help
explain why states choose to equip IOs with more or less
authority. Alternatively, our data can be used as indepen-
dent variables to help explain important outcomes in world
politics associated with IO authority, such as their perfor-
mance in terms of conflict prevention, their legitimacy, or
their politicization. That way, our data helps to advance our
knowledge of IOs, allowing scholars to analyze their rele-
vance, functions, and effects in world politics.
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Notes
1. We would like to thank for valuable comments and substantive con-
ceptual discussion Autumn Lockwood Payton and Matthias Ecker-
Ehrhardt. We also thank the editors of Global Policy and two anony-
mous reviewers for their constructive feedback and suggestions.
Finally, we thank our research assistants Rebecca Majewski, Xaver
Keller, Corinna Kohl, Eylem Kanol, Alexander Meier, Bettine Josties,
Sascha Riaz, and Senem Tepe.
2. The data that support the findings of this study are openly available
in Harvard Dataverse at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/VA6RQV
3. Rule precision is the third factor that influences legalization.
4. If an IO scores zero on either or both of the two dimensions, the IO
has no authority according to our understanding of the concept. A
highly autonomous IO whose decisions and policies are not binding
upon states at all would have no authority. The same holds for an
IO that generates highly binding policy output but is fully depen-
dent on the consensus of all member states. In this case, the orga-
nization does not enjoy any autonomy. By contrast, an IO enjoys
authority if not all member states can veto decision making and
policy implementation and if the policy output is – at least to some
extent – binding.
5. Autonomy scores zero when a function is not institutionalized in
the legal texts. We assign an autonomy value of 1 when the assem-
bly adopts rules with unanimity and when changing that decision
requires unanimity as well. For example, the European Council
adopts the Union’s budget with unanimity decision; changes to the
budget require consensus among the Council members.
6. In the supplemental material, we further illustrate our coding using
the monitoring function.
7. The supplemental material explains the geometric mean procedure
in more detail and provides examples of aggregation.
8. Typically, the functions we consider are performed by one IO body
only. In the case that the same function is exercised by more than
one body, choosing the maximum is closer to our theoretical con-
cept.
9. We do not weigh functions, since we consider that they equally
contribute to authority. Of course, any user of our data can choose
to use weights.
10. The supplemental material details the entire procedure.
11. Table SI.8 contains the percentage distributions of IOs in the popu-
lation and our sample.
12. Haftel and Thompson (2006) come to similar conclusions in their
analysis of the independence of 30 Regional Integration Arrange-
ments. By contrast, Hooghe et al. (2019) are more optimistic with
respect to IO authority and its growth over time.
13. The average authority across time and IOs is 0.24 with a standard
deviation of 0.18. The between-IO variation in authority is 0.17 and
the within-IO variation is 0.057. The total N of our cross-section
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time-series data is 1694 with 34 IOs and an average temporal span
of 49 years.
14. See Appendix S1 for an overview of non-overlapping and overlap-
ping functions across MIA and IAD.
15. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this example.
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